

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 4915

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR PARM UR US

SUBJECT: ARMS CONTROL WORKING GROUPS: INITIAL SUGGESTIONS

SUMMARY: AS A CONTRIBUTION TO WASHINGTON'S CONSIDERATION OF MODALITIES WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING MOSCOW PERSPECTIVES ON HOW BEST TO ACTIVATE THE WORKING GROUPS AGREED IN MOSCOW AND GET THE SOVIETS INVOLVED IN A PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE ON THE THEMES THAT ARE TO BE THEIR FOCUS. END SUMMARY.

1. SOVIET ATTITUDES: SINCE THE WORKING GROUP APPROACH WAS ESSENTIALLY A U.S. INITIATIVE AND THE PUBLICITY SINCE THE VANCE TRIP HAS BEEN ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY AMERICAN, WE SHOULD MAKE THE FIRST MOVE. FROM OUR INITIAL READING OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS THESE WORKING GROUPS, IT IS CLEAR THE SOVIETS WILL TAKE LITTLE IF ANY INITIATIVE.

2. MOREOVER, SOVIETS ARE TRADITIONALLY CAUTIOUS ABOUT NEW APPROACHES WHICH THEY HAVE NOT FULLY DIGESTED. ADDITIONALLY, THEY MAY BE RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE IN ANY ACTIVITY WHICH THEY FEEL MAY TEND TO DILUTE THE FOCUS ON SALT. NEVERTHELESS, THEY ARE COMMITTED, AND WE BELIEVE THEY WILL EVENTUALLY WISH TO ENGAGE US IN USEFUL BILATERAL EXCHANGES ON MANY OF THE TOPICS WHICH THE GROUPS WILL BE CONSIDERING. WE MUST ALSO RECKON WITH A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIETS
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MAY DECIDE THAT THEY ARE INTERESTED IN ADDING NEW WORKING GROUPS TO EXAMINE TOPICS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THEM (E.G. MDW, NUF, OR NON-FIRST USE), PROBABLY IN RESPONSE TO OUR FIRST APPROACH TO THEM OR DURING THE MAY MEETING IN GENEVA. WE SHOULD IF AT ALL POSSIBLE ATTEMPT TO DISSUADE THE SOVIETS FROM PUSHING ADDITIONAL TOPICS UNTIL WE HAVE

INITIATED DISCUSSIONS ON THOSE ALREADY AGREED TO IN MOSCOW. BUT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH THIS GAMBIT WHEN, AS WE SUGGEST BELOW, WE FIRST CONTACT THEM ON THE WORKING GROUPS.

3. INDUCTING SOVIET COOPERATION: IF WE ARE TO CONVINCE THE SOVIETS THAT WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT THE WORKING GROUPS, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD PUT FORWARD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE --WITHIN WEEKS --SPECIFIC, REALISTIC PROPOSALS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF THE WORKING GROUPS. THIS SHOULD BE DONE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES AIMED AT GETTING THE SOVIETS TO CONTRIBUTE IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS ON ORGANIZATION AND AGENDAS, IN RESPONSE TO OUR SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS. ONLY AFTER WE HAVE HAD SUCH AN INITIAL EXCHANGE SHOULD WE CONSIDER WHAT, IF ANY, PUBLIC STATEMENTS WE MIGHT WISH TO MAKE. GIVEN CURRENT SOVIET SENSITIVITIES IN THIS REGARD, WE WILL BE ABLE TO INDUCE MORE SOVIET COOPERATION ON THESE GROUPS IF WE DOWNPLAY, AT LEAST INITIALLY, PRESS ATTENTION TO THEM, AND IN ANY EVENT CONSULT WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE LEVEL OF PUBLICITY TO BE GIVEN.

4. FIRST CONTACTS WITH SOVIETS:
WE RECOMMEND THAT
BETWEEN NOW AND THE FIRST OF MAY A SPECIFIC PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS CONCERNING TIMING, LEVEL, VENUE AND AGENDAS BE PREPARED FOR PRESENTATION TO THE SOVIETS
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AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL IN MOSCOW. WE SHOULD REQUEST INITIAL SOVIET REACTIONS WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE MAY MEETING OF THE SECRETARY WITH GROMYKO SO THAT SOME AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN GENEVA ON SPECIFIC STARTING DATES AND AGENDAS FOR THE WORKING GROUPS. OUR INITIAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOVIETS SHOULD CONTAIN RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE COMPOSITION, MEETING PLACE, STARTING DATE AND AGENDA FOR EACH GROUP.

5. COMPOSITION: WE BELIEVE THE WORKING GROUPS IN THE FIRST STAGES SHOULD BE HEADED BY A DEPARTMENTAL OR ACDA OFFICIAL OF AT LEAST OFFICE DIRECTOR LEVEL. FOR SOME GROUPS, E.G. NON-PROLIFERATION AND INDIAN OCEAN, WE SHOULD PROBABLY OPT FOR MORE SENIOR OFFICERS AS HEADS OF DELEGATION.

6. WE ALSO RECOMMEND THAT A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EMBASSY BE INCLUDED IN MOST U.S. DELEGATIONS -- E.G.

AN EMBASSY COUNSELOR OR SENIOR FIRST
SECRETARY --BOTH TO PROVIDE THE MOSCOW PERSPECTIVE
WHICH IS HELPFUL IN ANY DELEGATION WORKING WITH THE
SOVIETS, BUT ALSO TO ENABLE THE EMBASSY TO
FOLLOW UP EFFECTIVELY WITH THE MOSCOW BUREAUCRACY
(WHEN THE WORKING GROUPS ARE NOT IN SESSION).

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. STEINER, S/S-O.

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7. ON THE WORKING GROUPS THERE SHOULD BE ADEQUATE
TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO INSURE
THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN A
DIALOGUE ON TECHNICAL POINTS.
OUR EXPERTS SHOULD BE CHOSEN
TO DEMONSTRATE INTERAGENCY UNITY. WITH SUCH A MIX
IN OUR DELEGATIONS WE WILL BE IN A BETTER POSITION
TO PERSUADE THE SOVIETS TO PRODUCE BALANCED
DELEGATIONS.

8. LOCATION: WE WOULD URGE THAT THE WORKING
GROUPS MEET FOR THE MOST PART
EITHER IN MOSCOW OR WASHINGTON. THIS
PROCEDURE WOULD HELP EMPHASIZE THE BILATERAL NATURE
OF THE CONTACTS AND WOULD PRODUCE FULLER INVOLVEMENT
OF THE BUREAUCRACIES IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE WORKING
GROUPS. WE SEE LITTLE VALUE IN AUTOMATICALLY CONVOKING
THE GROUPS IN A THIRD COUNTRY SITE (E.G. GENEVA) SINCE
THIS WOULD ONLY SERVE TO DRAW PUBLIC ATTENTION TO
THE WORK OF THE GROUPS WITHOUT ANY OFFSETTING ADVAN-
TAGE. MOSCOW HAS THE ADDED ADVANTAGE OF IMPROVING
THE CHANCES FOR HIGH LEVEL CLEARANCES FOR SOVIET
RESPONSES TO OUR PROPOSALS, ELIMINATING THE COMMUNI-

CATIONS LAG WHICH SO OFTEN DELAYS RESPONSES BY
SOVIET DELEGATIONS LOCATED ELSEWHERE, AND REDUCING
THE CHANCES FOR PRESS LEAKAGE ON SENSITIVE SUBJECTS.
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ONCE THE MAIN OUTLINES OF SOVIET POSITIONS HAVE
EMERGED, SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS MIGHT SWITCH TO
WASHINGTON OR EVEN THIRD COUNTRY CITIES IF
CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT.

9. TIMING: AS STATED ABOVE WE LOOK TO THE END OF
APRIL AS A REASONABLE DATE TO APPROACH THE SOVIETS
WITH OUR SUGGESTIONS ON ORGANIZATION AND AGENDAS FOR
ALL WORKING GROUPS (WE DO NOT THINK, HOWEVER, A
DELAY IN ONE AREA SHOULD BE AN EXCUSE FOR NOT MOVING
IN OTHERS). WE SHOULD REQUEST A SOVIET RESPONSE
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, INFORMING THEM THAT WE WOULD LIKE
TO AGREE ON STARTING DATES, AGENDAS
(OR AT LEAST KEY TOPICS), VENUE, AND COMPOSITION
OF DELEGATIONS FOR AS MANY WORKING GROUPS AS POSSIBLE
DURING THE MAY MEETINGS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND
GROMYKO.

10. THE WORKING GROUPS: THE FOLLOWING ARE OUR
INITIAL THOUGHTS ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SEVERAL
WORKING GROUPS.

--CIVIL DEFENSE: THE SOVIETS WILL PROBABLY DRAG
THEIR FEET IN THIS AREA SINCE IT INVOLVES DEFENSE
PLANNING AGAINST NOT ONLY U.S. ATTACK, BUT ALSO
AGAINST WESTERN EUROPEAN AND CHINESE CONTINGENCIES.
WE RECOMMEND THAT THIS GROUP MEET INITIALLY IN
MOSCOW DURING JULY AND THEN ALTERNATE BETWEEN THE TWO
CAPITALS. IN ADDITION TO AN AGENDA FOR EXAM-
INING AND COMPARING CD DOCTRINE AND DATA, WE MIGHT
PROPOSE LIMITED JOINT EXAMINATION OF CIVIL DEFENSE
CACILITIES IN EACH COUNTRY. IT IS TO THIS GROUP THAT
WE BELIEVE THE EMBASSY CAN MAKE A STRONG CONTRIBU-
TION SINCE CLOSE EXAMINATION OF SOVIET EFFORTS
ON THE GROUND HAS GIVEN US A KNOWLEDGE ANDPERSPEC-
TIVE WHICH SHOULD BE OF PARTICULAR VALUE TO THE U.S.
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DELEGATION, TWO EMBASSY STAFF EXPERTS, INCLUDING
A DEFENSE ATTACHE, SHOULD BE INCLUDED ON THE U.S.
DELEGATION.

--MISSILE TEST NOTIFICATION: THIS GROUP SHOULD BE ABLE TO MEET SOONER AND MOVE FASTER THAN OTHERS, SINCE THE AGENDA IS ALREADY RELATIVELY NARROWLY DEFINED AND THE WORKING GROUP CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CSCE EXPERIENCE IN CBM NOTIFICATIONS TO FACILITATE AGREEMENT. GIVEN ITS DIRECT CONNECTION WITH THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS, THE EXISTING SCC IN GENEVA WOULD SEEM TO BE THE LOGICAL VENUE FOR THESE DISCUSSIONS.

--INDIAN OCEAN:THIS IS ANOTHER VERY DIFFICULT SUBJECT INVOLVING LONG-RANGE PROJECTIONS OF POWER, MULTILATERAL CONSIDERATIONS, AND THE NECESSITY FOR HIGH-LEVEL INTERAGENCY COORDINATION ONBOTH SIDES. WE ANTICIPATE THAT DIFFICULTIES IN WORKING OUT RESPECTIVE POSITIONS WILLDELAY THE START OF MEETINGS FOR THIS GROUP, BUT A JULY BEGINNING IS A REASONABLE GOAL. AFTER DELINEATING THE AREA TO BE COVERED, THE MOST DIFFICULT INITIAL ITEM ON THE AGENDA WILL BE AGREEMENT ON HOW TO DEFINE OR SUCCESSFULLY DEAL WITH THE ISSUE ON WHAT IS A "BASE", SINCE THE SOVIETS ADAMANTLY DENY HAVING BASES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. GIVEN THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL

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COMPLEXITIES OF THE ISSUE, A DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHOULD LEAD THE U.S. DELEGATION TO IMPRESS ON THE SOVIETS THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TOSUBSTANTIVE POLICY DISCUSSIONS. WE THINK THIS IS A WORKING GROUP WHICH WOULD BENEFIT FROM FREQUENT CONTACT

WITH HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET MILITARY OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW SINCE THE SUBJECT MATTER CONCERNS SEVERAL MINISTRIES HERE. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT THE FIRST MEETING TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW. AS EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVE ON THE U.S. DELEGATION, WE WOULD SUGGEST THE POLITICAL COUNSELOR OR THE POLITICAL OFFICER FOR ASIAN AFFAIRS.

--ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS: IN THIS MOST TECHNICAL AND LITTLE EXAMINED TOPIC FOR DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS, WE ANTICIPATE SEVERAL LONG SESSIONS OF TECHNICAL EXCHANGES BEFORE MOVING ON TO ANY SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN LIMITING OR ELIMINATING SUCH WEAPONS. WE THINK THE MOST LOGICAL VENUE FOR SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE, AS IT IS FOR THE MISSILE TEST WORKING GROUP, IN THE SCC IN GENEVA.

--CHEMICAL WEAPONS: THIS TOPIC HAS ALREADY RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION IN THE CCD AND WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED A ROUND OF BILATERAL TECHNICAL CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS IN GENEVA. OUR
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AGREEMENT TO PRODUCE A JOINT INITIATIVE PROVIDES THE GROUP WITH ITS MAJOR AGENDA TOPIC. WE RECOMMEND THE WORKING GROUP FORM AROUND THE EXISTING BILATERAL EXPERT MEETINGS WE PERIODICALLY HOLD IN GENEVA, BUT THERE SHOULD BE PROVISION FOR CONTINUED ACTIVITY WHEN THE CCD IS NOT IN SESSION.

--CTB: COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN DISCUSSION MUST FOCUS AT THE OUTSET ON THE TROUBLESOME ISSUE OF PNES AND THEN ON VERIFICATION. WE RECOMMEND AGAINST A GENEVA VENUE SO TO ESTABLISH A BILATERAL DIALOGUE FULLY SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE CCD. THE WORKING GROUP COULD REASONABLY EXPECT TO MEET FAIRLY QUICKLY FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF THE U.S. INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF THE ISSUE.

--NON PROLIFERATION: THE PRESIDENT'S APRIL 7 STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR POLICY PROVIDES AN IDEAL BASIS FOR A USEFUL BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. THE SOVIETS ARE INTERESTED IN HAVING SUCH AN EXCHANGE ON THIS AND OTHER ASPECTS OUTSIDE THE LONDON CLUB, THE ONLY EXISTING FORUM AT PRESENT. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE PLANNED APRIL 26 BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN NYE AND MOROKHOV COULD TRIGGER THE ORGANIZATION OF THE WORKING GROUPS AND FORMULATION OF ITS INITIAL AGENDA. WE RECOMMEND THAT ALTERNATE

SESSIONS IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON BE THE DRILL FOR THIS WORKING GROUPS AND THAT THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION OF THE TWO DELEGATIONS BE SOMEWHAT FLEXIBLE TO ALLOW FOR THE WIDE VARIETY OF NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES WHICH MAY BE RAISED. MOROKHOV WILL BE THE KEY FIGURE ON THE SOVIET SIDE AND PERHAPS THE ONLY VALID INTERLOCUTOR ON SOVIET NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY.

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--RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: THIS TOPIC AFFORDS THE MOST INVITING TARGET FOR THE SOVIETS TO INTRODUCE THEIR OWN TOPIC OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (MDW). WE HAVE ALREADY INTRODUCED THE RW ISSUE INTO THE CCD AND THEREFORE WE SHOULD CONSIDER THIS WORKING GROUP ALONG WITH THE CW GROUP AS THE BEST CANDIDATE FOR MEETINGS IN GENEVA. HOWEVER, AS WITH THE CW DISCUSSIONS WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD LIMIT THE WORKING GROUP'S ACTIVITY TO THE PERIODS WHEN THE CCD IS IN SESSION.

--CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS: THIS TOPIC IS FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES UNEXPLORED AND AS SUCH WILL REQUIRE DETAILED PREPARATION ON BOTH SIDES BEFORE MOVING DIRECTLY TO BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. WE, THEREFORE, ANTICIPATE A LONGER DEALY IN INVOLVING THIS WORKING GROUP THAN THE OTHERS AND, IN ANY CASE, WE CAN EXPECT SOVIET NEGATIVISM SINCE THEIR BAISIC POSITION IS THAT ACTION ON TRANSFERS MUST AWAIT POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS.
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